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PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION IN THE HERITAGE OF MURTAZA MUTAHHARI: THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITY OF RATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

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ФИЛОСОФИЯ И РЕЛИГИЯ В НАСЛЕДИИ МУРТАЗЫ МУТАХАРИ: ПРОБЛЕМА ЕДИНСТВА РАЦИОНАЛЬНОГО И РЕЛИГИОЗНОГО ЗНАНИЯ

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Abstract. This article examines the relationship between philosophy and religion in the intellectual heritage of Murtaza Mutahhari (1920–1979), focusing on his attempt to establish the unity and complementarity of rational and religious knowledge. The study is organized according to the IMRaD structure and combines conceptual, hermeneutic, comparative, and historical-philosophical methods. Its primary conceptual basis consists of Mutahhari's discussions of science and faith, the philosophical, scientific, and religious worldviews, tawhid, revelation, philosophy, and Islamic methods of thought. The analysis shows that Mutahhari rejects both a fideistic separation of religion from reason and a reductionist rationalism that treats empirical or philosophical knowledge as sufficient for the whole of human existence. In his model, science discloses particular relations and practical mechanisms, philosophy seeks universal principles and an intellectually coherent worldview, while revelation gives access to ultimate orientation, purpose, and moral-spiritual meaning. Religious faith is therefore not presented as the negation of knowledge, but as an existential and value-laden mode of assent that requires cognitive foundations. The article argues that the unity of rational and religious knowledge in Mutahhari is best understood through a tawhidic worldview: truth is one, although human access to it is differentiated by method and level. This framework also explains his insistence that knowledge without faith may become ethically directionless, whereas faith without knowledge may degenerate into imitation and dogmatism. The study concludes that Mutahhari's synthesis remains relevant to contemporary philosophy of religion, Islamic epistemology, and debates on science, ethics, and religious education.

Аннотация. Рассматривается взаимосвязь философии и религии в интеллектуальном наследии Муртазы Мутаххари (1920–1979) — в частности, его попытка обосновать единство и взаимодополняемость рационального и религиозного знания. Исследование построено по структуре IMRaD и опирается на сочетание концептуального, герменевтического, сравнительного и историко-философского методов. В качестве концептуальной основы выступают идеи Мутаххари о науке и вере, философском, научном и религиозном мировоззрениях, концепции таухида (единобожия), откровении, философии и исламских методах мышления. Анализ показывает, что Мутаххари отвергает как фидеистический разрыв между религией и разумом, так и редукционистский рационализм, рассматривающий эмпирическое или философское знание как исчерпывающее для человеческого бытия. Согласно его модели, наука раскрывает частные закономерности и практические механизмы, философия стремится к постижению универсальных принципов и созданию целостной, логически непротиворечивой картины мира, а откровение открывает доступ к фундаментальным жизненным ориентирам, целям и духовно-нравственным смыслам. Таким

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образом, религиозная вера предстает не как отрицание знания, а как экзистенциальный, ценностно-насыщенный акт принятия, который нуждается в когнитивном обосновании. В статье утверждается, что единство рационального и религиозного знания у Мутаххари наиболее полно раскрывается через призму мировоззрения таухида: истина едина, хотя пути доступа к ней различаются в зависимости от используемого метода и уровня познания. Этот подход также объясняет, почему Мутаххари настаивает на том, что знание без веры может утратить этические ориентиры, тогда как вера без знания — выродиться в слепое подражание и догматизм. В заключение отмечается, что синтез, предложенный Мутаххари, сохраняет свою актуальность для современной философии религии, исламской эпистемологии, а также для дискуссий о науке, этике и религиозном образовании.

Keywords: Murtaza Mutahhari; philosophy; religion; reason; faith; knowledge; revelation; tawhid; Islamic philosophy; epistemology.

Ключевые слова: Муртаза Мутаххари; философия; религия; разум; вера; знание; откровение; таухид; исламская философия; эпистемология.

The relation between reason and revelation is one of the foundational questions of the philosophy of religion. In the Islamic intellectual tradition, the problem has appeared in several forms: whether unaided reason can know God and moral truth; whether rational proof is required to justify religious belief; and how apparent conflicts between philosophical or scientific conclusions and revelation should be interpreted [1].

These questions remained central in modern Muslim thought, especially when inherited philosophical and theological traditions encountered the intellectual authority of modern science, secular philosophies, and new political ideologies. Murtaza Mutahhari occupies a distinctive place in this modern debate. Educated in the traditional seminarian environment of Qom and deeply engaged with Islamic philosophy, kalam, jurisprudence, and modern intellectual currents, he sought to present Islamic thought as a rationally defensible and existentially meaningful worldview. His works address philosophy, theology, ethics, history, society, human nature, divine justice, revelation, and the relationship between science and faith. A scholarly study devoted specifically to the relation of faith and knowledge in his philosophy emphasizes that Mutahhari does not treat them as a dichotomy: knowledge is a necessary condition of religious faith, while faith provides an inward, value-forming dimension that knowledge alone does not supply [2].

The research problem arises from a persistent tendency to describe rational and religious knowledge as competing epistemic authorities. Such a binary interpretation does not adequately explain Mutahhari's position. His writings distinguish different kinds and levels of knowledge, but simultaneously seek their integration within a monotheistic worldview. The purpose of this article is therefore to reconstruct the philosophical logic of this integration and to determine the functions, limits, and mutual relations of science, philosophy, revelation, and faith in Mutahhari's heritage.

The study addresses four questions: 1. How does Mutahhari distinguish scientific, philosophical, and religious knowledge; 2. What epistemic role does reason play in religious belief; 3. How does the tawhidic worldview integrate different modes of knowledge; 4. What philosophical significance does this model have for contemporary discussions of rationality and religion? The study uses a qualitative historical-philosophical design. The primary textual corpus includes Mutahhari's Fundamentals of Islamic Thought: God, Man and the Universe, especially the sections "Man and Faith", "The Worldview of Tawhid", and "What Is Philosophy?"; Man and Faith; Understanding Islamic Sciences; and his discussions of divine justice and revelation. Secondary sources include Y.

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E. Fedorova's analysis of faith and knowledge in Mutahhari, general scholarship on Islamic philosophy of religion, and studies of the philosophical tradition within which Mutahhari worked [1-5].

Four methods were applied. Conceptual analysis was used to distinguish knowledge, science, philosophy, worldview, faith and revelation. Hermeneutic analysis reconstructed these terms within Mutahhari's own intellectual context rather than imposing contemporary analytic categories without qualification. Comparative analysis identified differences among scientific, philosophical and religious worldviews. Finally, structural modelling was used to represent the proposed unity of rational and religious knowledge as a layered rather than competitive epistemology. The article does not treat Mutahhari's theological claims as empirical scientific hypotheses. Instead, it examines the internal philosophical coherence of his model: what kinds of questions each mode of knowledge addresses, what limits Mutahhari attributes to them, and how he argues for their complementarity. This distinction is necessary to avoid both theological apologetics and reductionist readings of religious knowledge. Mutahhari begins his account of the human person by emphasizing two dimensions that exceed purely animal existence: the expansion of knowledge and the expansion of desire, aspiration and value. In Man and Faith, science and faith become two central pillars of humanity [3; 4].

Knowledge enlarges the human capacity to understand reality and to act effectively within it; faith gives direction, attachment and meaning to human action. Their functions are therefore different but not mutually exclusive. This distinction allows Mutahhari to reject a simplistic substitution model. Scientific development cannot automatically replace religious faith because the two respond to different dimensions of human existence. Science can increase power and disclose causal relations, but it does not by itself determine which ends are worthy of pursuit. Faith, in turn, cannot legitimately function as a substitute for investigation into the empirical structure of nature. The unity Mutahhari seeks is therefore functional complementarity within a common conception of truth.

RATIONAL INQUIRY	conceptual analysis, demonstration, philosophy
RELIGIOUS FAITH	meaning, commitment, moral orientacion
REVELATION	transcendent quidance, prophetic knowledge
TAWHIDIC WORLDVIEW	unity of truth, universe and human purpose
INTEGRATED KNOWLEDGE	sciense and reason quided by ethical-spiritual mean

Figure. Integrative model of rational and religious knowledge in Murtaza Mutahhari's thought

A central result of the analysis concerns Mutahhari's distinction among scientific, philosophical and religious worldviews. In Fundamentals of Islamic Thought, he describes scientific knowledge as dependent on hypothesis and experiment and as especially effective in discovering limited causal relations [3].

Yet the scientific worldview is restricted by the range of empirical verification. It can explain many particular processes without necessarily answering questions concerning the ultimate origin, totality, value and purpose of existence. Philosophical knowledge has a different scope. It seeks universal principles and attempts to interpret existence as a whole. For Mutahhari, philosophy is therefore closer than the empirical sciences to the construction of a worldview. It asks questions about being, causality, necessity, unity, change and the ultimate structure of reality. Religious worldview,

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however, adds a further dimension: revelation and faith situate the world within an ultimate horizon of origin, purpose and moral responsibility.

Table 1

COMPARISON OF SCIENTIFIC, PHILOSOPHICAL AND RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE IN MUTAHHARI'S FRAMEWORK

Dimension	*Scientific knowledge*	*Philosophical knowledge*	*Religious knowledge*
Primary method	Observation, hypothesis, experiment	Rational analysis and demonstration	Revelation interpreted through reason and tradition
Main object	Particular phenomena and relations	Universal principles of existence	Origin, purpose, value and human relation to God
Strength	Empirical precision and practical effectiveness	Conceptual universality and worldview formation	Existential orientation and moral-spiritual meaning
Limit	Cannot by itself provide a total worldview	Discursive reason remains human and fallible	Requires interpretation nd must avoid uncritical imitation
Role in unity	Explains mechanisms	Provides rational coherence	Provides transcendent orientation

Mutahhari's position does not reduce religious belief to an irrational act of obedience. The philosophical significance of his approach lies precisely in his insistence that authentic faith has a cognitive foundation. Fedorova's analysis shows that he regards knowledge as a necessary condition of religious faith and interprets faith and knowledge as complementary rather than antagonistic categories [2].

This is consistent with a broader Islamic philosophical debate in which reason can function both as a source of religious knowledge and as a means of justifying particular beliefs [1].

For Mutahhari, rational reflection protects religion from blind imitation. A faith that cannot distinguish evidence from inherited habit is vulnerable to superstition and ideological manipulation. Reason tests arguments, clarifies concepts, and allows the believer to understand what is affirmed. At the same time, Mutahhari does not identify faith with the mere possession of propositions. A person may intellectually know a claim without allowing it to shape desire, conduct, and character. Faith, therefore, includes an existential dimension that exceeds neutral cognition.

The concept of tawhid provides the metaphysical foundation for the unity of knowledge. Mutahhari's monotheistic worldview does not mean merely the numerical affirmation that God is one. It implies the unity and intelligibility of existence, the dependence of the universe on a single ultimate principle, and the coherence of human moral orientation. The world is not divided into unrelated sacred and rational domains. If truth has one ultimate source, genuine rational knowledge and authentic revelation cannot be contradictory at the deepest level, although human interpretations of either may conflict. This principle changes the structure of the reason – religion debate. Apparent contradiction becomes a problem of interpretation, evidence, or epistemic level rather than proof that reason and religion are inherently enemies. Scientific statements may be revised because empirical inquiry is provisional; philosophical arguments may fail because reasoning is fallible; religious texts may be misunderstood because interpretation is historically and linguistically mediated. Tawhid thus functions as a regulative principle of coherence rather than as permission to ignore disagreement. Mutahhari's defence of rationality is also visible in his account of Islamic philosophy. In Understanding Islamic Sciences and related writings, he presents philosophy, kalam, and irfan as distinct but historically interacting methods of Islamic thought [5].

His discussions of Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophy, as well as the post-Avicennan tradition, demonstrate that philosophical reasoning is not treated as foreign to Islam simply because it employs conceptual demonstration. At the same time, philosophy is not absolutized. Mutahhari's

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intellectual background was strongly shaped by the later Islamic philosophical tradition, particularly the synthesis associated with Mulla Sadra, in which rational demonstration, metaphysical insight, and revealed religion are placed in a complex relationship. The important point for the present study is methodological: philosophical reason has legitimacy, but its conclusions belong within a larger search for truth rather than a closed autonomous system. Revelation occupies a unique epistemic position because it is not, in Mutahhari's account, simply another human theory about the world. It introduces knowledge related to prophetic guidance, ultimate purpose, and dimensions of reality that are not reducible to sensory experimentation. Yet revelation reaches human beings through language, interpretation, and historical understanding. Consequently, reason remains indispensable in identifying, interpreting, and systematizing religious meaning. The relation is therefore asymmetrical but cooperative. Reason does not manufacture revelation, while revelation does not abolish rational responsibility. This prevents two extremes: a rationalism that accepts only what can be independently derived from philosophical or scientific method, and a fideism that treats rational questioning as a threat to faith. Mutahhari's position is better described as rationally articulated religious epistemology.

Table 2

FUNCTIONS OF REASON AND REVELATION
IN THE FORMATION OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

Epistemic function	*Reason*	*Revelation*	*Integrated result*
Concept formation	Clarifies terms and distinctions	Provides religious concepts and symbolic language	Conceptually articulated doctrine
Justification	Evaluates arguments and consistency	Supplies prophetic testimony and sacred authority	Reasoned religious conviction
Worldview	Seeks universal coherence	Discloses transcendent origin and purpose	Tawhidic interpretation of reality
Ethics	Analyzes consequences and principles	Provides moral-spiritual orientation	Responsible action
Self-correction	Critiques fallacious reasoning and interpretation	Challenges reduction of reality to the empirical	Epistemic humility

One of Mutahhari's strongest claims is that the problem of knowledge and faith is not purely theoretical. Scientific and technical knowledge expands the sphere of human power. The question of how this power is used requires values, goals, and moral self-limitation. In this sense, faith is not introduced to compete with science at the level of empirical explanation; it addresses the orientation of the agent who uses knowledge. Conversely, faith that is detached from knowledge can become vulnerable to fanaticism, imitation, and misrecognition of the world. Rational education is therefore also a religious necessity. The mature person must understand the object of belief, distinguish essential principles from accidental customs, and remain capable of critical reflection. Mutahhari's unity of faith and knowledge consequently has an educational dimension: intellectual and moral formation should proceed together. The results also show that Mutahhari's unity thesis should not be interpreted as a claim that science, philosophy, and religion use the same method. Their unity concerns truth and human orientation, not methodological uniformity. Experimental science requires observation and testability; philosophy depends on conceptual argument; revelation is tied to prophetic knowledge and sacred transmission. Confusing these domains would weaken rather than strengthen their relationship. Accordingly, the most defensible reconstruction of Mutahhari's model is a differentiated unity. Distinct epistemic practices can cooperate because they address overlapping but non-identical questions. Conflict becomes serious when one domain makes totalizing claims

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beyond its competence — for example, when empirical science is transformed into a metaphysical assertion that only empirically measurable realities exist, or when a religious interpretation makes an empirical claim while refusing any evidential scrutiny. The findings support the interpretation that Mutahhari develops an integrative rather than competitive model of rational and religious knowledge. This conclusion is consistent with the specialized literature on his relation between faith and knowledge. Fedorova argues that Mutahhari understands them as mutually complementary and locates their unity in a monotheistic worldview [2].

The present analysis extends this point by showing that the unity depends on a differentiated account of epistemic functions: empirical science, philosophy, revelation, and faith do not contribute the same type of content. This model can be situated within the broader Islamic philosophy-of-religion tradition. The historical debate over reason and faith includes questions about the unaided intellect, rational justification of belief, and the reconciliation of revelation with philosophical or scientific conclusions [1].

Mutahhari inherits these questions but addresses them under modern conditions in which science has acquired exceptional cultural authority. His response is neither to deny science nor to grant it monopoly over meaningful knowledge. The distinction between scientific and philosophical worldviews is especially significant. Mutahhari recognizes the power of experimental science but argues that a worldview must answer questions broader than those accessible to laboratory methods [3].

This does not establish the truth of a religious worldview by itself; rather, it identifies a category mistake in treating empirical method as if it could settle every metaphysical and axiological question. Philosophy becomes the rational bridge because it asks about universal principles and the whole of existence. At the same time, the religious worldview is not merely an additional explanatory hypothesis. Faith changes the existential relation of the person to what is known. This is why knowledge and faith can be complementary even when they concern some of the same objects. Knowing a proposition about God and living in trust, responsibility, and worship are not identical acts. Mutahhari's epistemology therefore contains an implicit distinction between propositional cognition and existential commitment. The tawhidic worldview provides the deepest unifying principle. Its philosophical strength lies in the claim that reality is ultimately coherent. If both rational inquiry and revelation are truth-oriented, contradiction cannot be final at the level of truth itself. Yet this principle must be handled carefully. It cannot be used to declare every inherited interpretation immune to criticism. On the contrary, because human understanding is fallible, the presumption of ultimate coherence should encourage re-examination of arguments, evidence, and interpretations.

Mutahhari's approach also has implications for contemporary discussions of science and religion. Many conflicts arise when methodological naturalism in science is transformed into metaphysical naturalism, or when scriptural interpretation is treated as a scientific account without attention to genre and hermeneutics. A differentiated unity avoids both moves. Science can remain methodologically rigorous, philosophy can evaluate metaphysical implications, and religion can address ultimate meaning and moral orientation without erasing the legitimate autonomy of empirical inquiry. A further implication concerns ethics. Modern societies possess forms of technical knowledge that dramatically increase human power, including biotechnology, artificial intelligence, surveillance, and environmental intervention. Mutahhari's claim that knowledge requires moral orientation is therefore not merely a historical religious argument. It raises a general philosophical problem: instrumental rationality can tell us how to achieve an end without deciding whether the end is worthy. His appeal to faith supplies one answer by embedding action in a moral-spiritual worldview. However, the model also has limitations. First, the assertion of ultimate harmony between reason and revelation depends on theological premises that are not universally shared. Second, the boundary

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between legitimate philosophical reasoning and authoritative religious interpretation can remain contested. Third, a modern pluralistic context includes multiple religious traditions and non-religious worldviews, so the tawhidic synthesis cannot simply be assumed as a public epistemology for all citizens. Its strongest contemporary value may therefore lie as an internally coherent Islamic philosophy of knowledge rather than a universally binding epistemic system. These limitations do not eliminate its comparative significance. Mutahhari offers a sophisticated alternative to the narrative that modernization necessarily requires the privatization of faith or the abandonment of metaphysics. His thought shows how a religious philosopher can affirm scientific inquiry, defend rational demonstration, and still argue that human knowledge remains incomplete without questions of meaning, value, and transcendence.

Table 3

CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL RELEVANCE
OF MUTAHHARI'S KNOWLEDGE–FAITH SYNTHESIS

Contemporary issue	*Mutahhari's contribution*	*Potential limitation*
Science and religion	Separates empirical method from total metaphysical worldview while affirming both inquiry and faith	Requires careful criteria for resolving concrete conflicts
Religious education	Connects belief with understanding and discourages blind imitation	Can become confessional if not adapted to pluralistic settings
Ethics of technology	Insists that knowledge and power require moral orientation	Religious values need translation into shared public reasoning
Epistemic pluralism	Recognizes differentiated methods and levels of knowledge	Unity is grounded in a specifically tawhidic metaphysics
Human flourishing	Integrates intellectual, moral and spiritual development	Concept of flourishing remains tradition-dependent

Conclusion

The study concludes that Murtaza Mutahhari's philosophy does not construct reason and religion as mutually exclusive sources of truth. His central strategy is to differentiate their functions while integrating them within a tawhidic worldview. Scientific knowledge explains particular empirical relations and expands practical capacity; philosophical reason seeks universal coherence and examines the foundations of existence; revelation provides transcendent guidance concerning origin, purpose, and moral-spiritual orientation; faith transforms knowledge into existential commitment and action. The unity of rational and religious knowledge is therefore not methodological identity. It is a differentiated unity based on the conviction that truth is ultimately coherent and that the human being requires more than one level of cognitive engagement with reality. Reason is indispensable to authentic religion because it protects belief from blind imitation, clarifies concepts, and evaluates arguments. Religious faith is indispensable to Mutahhari's anthropology because knowledge alone does not determine the ends toward which human power should be directed. The philosophical importance of this synthesis lies in its rejection of two reductions: the reduction of religion to irrational feeling and the reduction of knowledge to empirical science. Mutahhari assigns philosophy a mediating role between the particularity of scientific explanation and the universality of worldview, while revelation expands the horizon toward ultimate meaning. The resulting epistemology is simultaneously rational, religious, and ethical. For contemporary philosophy of religion, Mutahhari's heritage remains relevant because it reframes the reason–faith problem as a question of levels, methods, and purposes of knowledge. Its limitations — especially its dependence on tawhidic metaphysics and the challenges of pluralistic public reason — should be acknowledged. Nevertheless, the model provides a substantial example of modern Islamic philosophical thinking in

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which intellectual rigor and religious commitment are treated not as enemies but as mutually corrective dimensions of the search for truth.

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